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Abstract 12 
 13 
Background 14 
Food smuggling and food trafficking are terms not currently defined in the food literature. 15 
This work sought to determine how such definitions could be developed in order to inform 16 
future research and surveillance activity. 17 
 18 
Scope and Approach 19 
The concept of food smuggling and food trafficking is considered, and regulatory food 20 
surveillance data for illegal and unauthorised imports and food trade incidents (n=347) into 21 
the European Union (EU) between 1987 and 2017 is explored and critiqued. 22 
 23 
Key findings 24 
Illegal imports, especially animal and fish products, can pose a threat to human and animal 25 
health, spread animal disease and invasive plant species, and lead to loss of wildlife and 26 
biodiversity. Local or regional food economies can be negatively impacted through the tax 27 
avoidance and evasion elements of food smuggling and coercive food trafficking. Illegal and 28 
unauthorised import is one of the six food fraud categories in the EU’s Risk Assesment for 29 
Food and Feed (RASFF) database. Reported illegal trade was highest for meat products 30 
followed by fruit and vegetables probably as a result of  purposive sampling and thus the data 31 
does not reflect the true incidence and type of illegal imports especially by individuals for 32 
personal use.  There are limited global strategies in place to address food smuggling and 33 
trafficking and this work seeks to translate lessons learnt from the processes developed to 34 
reduce tobacco smuggling. This paper fills a current gap in the academic literature on this 35 
topic. 36 
 37 
 38 
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 40 
Highlights  41 
  42 
 Food smuggling and trafficking is an under-researched phenomenon. 43 
 Illicit food trade can introduce animal and plant disease and reduce tax revenue. 44 
 There are limited global strategies in place to address food smuggling 45 
 Activities to address tobacco smuggling could be used to reduce illicit food trade. 46 
  47 
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1. Illegal trade 48 
 49 
 Smuggling is the illegal trading of goods across borders (Joossens & Raw, 2012); the 50 
import of contraband goods (Ferrier, 2009), or the movement of goods into or out of a country 51 
or trading region often to circumvent tariffs or legal duty. Smuggling is an ancient practice and 52 
forms one element of a set of wider informal, illegal or illicit economic activities not 53 
successfully regulated by government (Hartnett & Dawdy, 2013). Illicit trade is “any practice 54 
or conduct prohibited by law and which relates to production, shipment, receipt, possession, 55 
distribution, sale or purchase including any practice
 
or conduct intended to facilitate such 56 
activity” (WHO, 2003). Illicit trade is differentiated by the nature of the goods (Bevan, Collier, 57 
& Gunning, 1988), for example, ‘black goods’ are illegal while ‘black parallel markets’ define 58 
legal goods being traded illegally at the supply chain level rather than single actors operating 59 
in an otherwise legitimate supply chain. Terms in use to describe illicit goods include black, 60 
grey, second, parallel, hidden, shadow, subterranean, unobserved, unreported, unrecorded, 61 
informal, clandestine or illegal (Feige, 1990). Therefore illicitness is neither an innate property 62 
of goods, nor of particular economic actors, but instead is a transient quality attribute often 63 
linked to the mechanisms of distribution or circulation of a food item (Gregson & Crang, 2016).   64 
 Illegal cross-border trade has been associated with milk products (Beutlich et al. 65 
2015), coffee (Dercon & Ayalew, 1995), meat and meat products (Europol, 2016; Beutlich et 66 
al,. 2015; Falk et al., 2013; FSA 2010) fish and fisheries (Pramod et al., 2014; Poh & Fanning, 67 
2012); bush meat and wildlife (Auliya et al.,  2016; Europol, 2016; Wyler & Sheikh, 2013; Falk 68 
et al., 2013; Regueira & Bernard, 2012; Chaber et al., 2010; Rice & Moore, 2008); and more 69 
widely timber (Cavanagh, Vedeld, & Trædal. 2015; Schaafsma et al., 2014), drugs (Cochrane 70 
& O’Regan, 2016; Rettberg & Ortiz-Rimalo, 2016) and human organs and people (Adhikari, 71 
2016; Salt, 2000).  72 
 Translating definitions with regard to human smuggling and trafficking, food 73 
smuggling can be described as when all parties involved, excluding regulatory and 74 
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enforcement agencies, are fully consenting to illicit behaviour whereas food trafficking 75 
involves coercion towards one or more parties, however, the fine line between smuggling and 76 
trafficking is sometimes unclear (Butterly, 2014). Díaz (2015) differentiates between small, 77 
petty smuggling (for personal use) and professional smuggling or trafficking for profit where 78 
a significant volume of goods is transported through international shipping channels (Ferrier, 79 
2009). Specific food products subject to additional import tariffs in order to protect national 80 
farmers may be more at risk of smuggling in order to avoid taxation or import tariffs (Lotta & 81 
Bogue, 2015). This highlights the economic driver for individuals and organisations to engage 82 
in such practice. Joossens and Raw (2012) differentiate between tax avoidance, legal and 83 
legitimate activities, and alternatively tax evasion, illegal activities, undertaken to pay less or 84 
no tax.  85 
Illicit trade can lead to food safety concerns especially the entry of foodborne 86 
pathogens into the European Union (EU) that can impact on human health (Ciolacu et al. 2016; 87 
Wagner, Skandamis & Rodríguez-Lázaro, 2015). This trade also has the potential to spread of 88 
animal disease across borders with the resultant trade restrictions, economic and social costs 89 
(Beutlich et al., 2015; Falk et al., 2013). Animal diseases of interest here include foot and 90 
mouth disease (Hartnett et al., 2007), classical swine fever (Woolridge, Hartnett, Cox, & 91 
Seaman, 2006), African swine fever (Costard et al., 2013; Woolridge et al., 2006) and zoonoses 92 
such as brucellosis (Nenova, Tomova, Saparevska, & Kantardjiev, 2015). Finally, food 93 
smuggling can negatively impact both wildlife and biodiversity especially for endangered 94 
species. Bush meat, the smuggling of flesh of exotic game and other wild animals, and more 95 
widely the trade in endangered species of animal is illicit and should be strictly controlled by 96 
the Convention of International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) of Wild Fauna and Flora 97 
(http://www.cites.org) (FSA, 2009). The complexity of the impact of illicit trade can be 98 
demonstrated by illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities that affect 99 
ecosystems, food security, and livelihoods and communities, create supply chain opacity, 100 
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distort competition and promote tax evasion around the world (Pramod, Nakamura, Pitcher 101 
& Delagran, 2014). The aim of this paper is to define and frame the impact of smuggling and 102 
trafficking on the legitimate food supply chain and identify the factors that influence 103 
organisational vulnerability to such activity. The case study trading block of focus in this 104 
research is the EU. 105 
 106 
2. Economic drivers for smuggling 107 
 Smuggling to gain economic advantage is ubiquitous. Smuggling of food and other 108 
commodities across borders is problematic and impacts directly on the economic growth of 109 
affected countries (Chen-Charpentier, Arenas, & Diaz-Rodriguez, 2015). The economic 110 
incentive for smuggling is the magnitude of differential between the price of a food in its 111 
original country and the price in the destination country (Ferrier, 2009) citing the examples of 112 
sugar, wheat and rice (Golub & Mbaye, 2007). Fresh garlic imports to the EU are subjected to 113 
ad valorem duty. As production costs in China are lower, the illegal import of Chinese fresh 114 
garlic is attractive to smugglers. OLAF (2010) highlight a smuggling operating route via Norway 115 
where garlic is exempted from customs duties and only value added tax (VAT) needs to be 116 
paid, so after customs clearance the Chinese garlic could be transferred to the EU instead of 117 
placing it on the market in Norway and thus bypassing such duty being paid. Also due to the 118 
intra-community trade within the EU this product could then be transferred to any country 119 
often without further inspection. In another example, Snowden (2012) asserted that one in 120 
ten bottles or cans of beer sold in the United Kingdom (UK) had not had duty paid on them 121 
with counterfeit alcohol sold by both licit and illicit retailers.  Ihle and Rubin (2013) state it is 122 
estimated that 35% of overall agricultural produce of the West Bank marketed in Israel was 123 
smuggled. The 2013 United States (US) honey smuggling incident led to the non-payment of 124 
US$40 million in taxes (Spink et al., 2016). Estimates consider the reach of the illicit IUU fishing 125 
economy encompasses between 13% and 31% of reported catches, and over half in some 126 
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regions with an associated value of between $10 and $23.5 billion per year (Pramod et al., 127 
2014; Agnew et al., 2009).  128 
Factors that can lead to “black” economic activity include high taxes or complex tax 129 
systems, low tax morale, low Gross Domestic Product, weak institutions and corruption 130 
(Snowden, 2012).  Ferrier (2009) asserts that differences in reported smuggling prevalence 131 
rates between countries is attributed to the types of goods affected by any trade prohibitions, 132 
the degree of opacity of smuggled goods and the ease of bringing incorrectly identified 133 
materials on manifest documents, and the targeting of any enforcement resources including 134 
purposive sampling.  135 
  Market and regulatory standards and the wider regulatory environment play a 136 
fundamental role in the transnational supply chain (Knoll et al., 2017). Indeed, the rationale 137 
for whether a specific country is given an export licence for a second country, or trading group, 138 
is largely based on consideration of existing national standards, and the degree of adoption 139 
within the  given internal supply chain of standards that address legality, food safety, quality 140 
and the control of animal disease. Brazil, as an example, has had a weak phytosanitary record 141 
over two decades with Foot and Mouth Disease in 2005, and Bovine Spongiform 142 
Encephalopathy (BSE) in 2011-2012 (Knoll et al., 2017). This has led to periods when Brazilian 143 
beef products were banned from the EU. When food products are produced in areas of the 144 
world with reduced public-private regulatory oversight this creates conflict with the 145 
regulatory checks and balances in place in the EU (Garnweidner, Terragni, Pettersen & 146 
Mosdøl, 2012; Baylis, Martens & Nogueira,  2009; Lawton et al., 2008). Where regulatory 147 
control increases in the EU, this in itself is a driver for an illicit, underground economy as 148 
demand still remains the same in specific countries for certain types of foods, but that demand 149 
cannot be met through legal supply routes. Further such illicit trade has reduced oversight 150 
because it is outside of the traditional multiple retailer dominated supply chains that have 151 
higher embedded private standards that supplier organisations are mandated to comply with 152 
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as a requirement for market access. Naim (2005) concludes that illicit trade is driven not from 153 
a moral standpoint, instead it is motivated by opportunity to make high profits. 154 
 155 
3. Food sanitary and biodiversity concerns associated with food smuggling  156 
 This section critiques the food sanitary and biodiversity concerns with food smuggling. 157 
In 2003, in California, an outbreak of Exotic Newcastle Disease said to have been caused by 158 
smuggled game birds from Mexico lead to approximately $168 million of eradication costs for 159 
farmers (Ferrier, 2009). Oniciuc et al., (2015)  in their work found illicit food items (16/200 160 
samples), purchased from an informal (black) market in Romania, contaminated with 161 
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) while Listeria monocytogenes was 162 
isolated from 7.5% of samples in another study (Ciolacu, Nicolau, Wagner & Rychli, 2015). 163 
Illicit food is thus a potential route for disseminating MRSA into the EU and it is difficult to 164 
estimate the amount of food from non-EU countries entering the EU black market where food 165 
products can come from Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Russia, but this is 166 
definitely a cause for concern (Oniciuc et al., 2015). It is also a challenge as the EU has many 167 
seaports, airports, and routes of entry. In addition to the standard entry and transit ports in 168 
Europe (e.g. via the Port of Rotterdam), food can also be smuggled into the EU via personal 169 
luggage of consumers and sold in black markets (Ciolacu et al., 2016). Schoder et al., (2015) 170 
sampled 600 products of animal origin (POAO) from more than 60,000 passengers from non-171 
EU countries. More than 50% of the POAO were milk products followed by meat products and 172 
bush meat. Most of the confiscated food products came from Asia. Foodborne pathogens 173 
were detected in 5% of the samples with the highest prevalence attributed to Listeria 174 
monocytogenes (2.5%), followed by verocytotoxin Escherichia coli (1.3%) and Salmonella spp 175 
(1.2%). Similarly, Rodriguez-Lazaro et al., (2015) tested 200 food samples of animal origin and 176 
found 20 samples were positive for L. monocytogenes (10%) and Salmonella spp. (5.5%).  177 
 7 
Illegal importation of livestock, fish or bushmeat was identified during checks at EU 178 
airports such as Paris Roissy-Charles de Gaulle airport (Chaber et al., 2010), and Zurich and 179 
Geneva airports, Switzerland (Falk et al., 2013). Examples of seized bushmeat include primate, 180 
ungulate, pangolin, rodents and crocodile (Chaber et al., 2010), and antelope, pangolin, 181 
porcupine, rodents and game animal (Falk et al., 2013).  Temmam et al., (2016) screened for 182 
viral pathogens in African bushmeat smuggled via France airport and found the presence of 183 
virus‐like particles in the samples confirming the presence of sequences related to the 184 
Siphoviridae, Myoviridae and Podoviridae bacteriophage families; some of them infecting 185 
bacterial hosts that could be potentially pathogenic for humans. 186 
One of the main reasons posited as to why illegal trade is high for bush meat is that 187 
exotic species form part of the traditional diet of newly emerging food sub-cultures in the EU 188 
and the wish to consume such exotic POAO is driven by religious observance or out of social 189 
reminiscence (Beutlich et al., 2015; Grabowski, Klein & López, 2013). Hunting and eating 190 
bushmeat is a longstanding cultural practice in these communities and is difficult for 191 
individuals to recognise the potential health and sanitary concerns in areas such as the EU 192 
(Bair-Brake et al. 2013). The role of the EU Rapid Alert for Food and Feed (RASFF) system is 193 
now considered. 194 
 195 
4. Holistic review of illegal or unauthorised imports into the EU 196 
Illegal or unauthorised import is one of the six food fraud categories in the RASFF 197 
database, a centralised platform developed to ensure the safety of food and animal feed in 198 
the EU (RASFF, 2017). Members including the European Commission, EU members, the 199 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 200 
Surveillance Authority, (i.e. Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) and Switzerland are obliged to 201 
notify and to exchange information on food and feed safety issues and measures (RASFF, 202 
2017). Between 1987 and 2017, 347 illegal import and food trade incidents were logged within 203 
 8 
the RASFF database. In this timeframe notifications for illegal trade were highest for meat 204 
products (n=62) followed by fruits and vegetables (n=58), other food products (n=39), fish and 205 
fish products (n=35) and poultry and poultry products (n=29) see Figure 1 and Table 1. 206 
Misrepresentative manifest documents are sometimes difficult to identify when food is 207 
packed into large containers and labelled in a foreign language and it may be impractical to 208 
check every element of the consignment (Ferrier, 2009). The enforcement authorities at ports 209 
will notify RASFF of any rejection related to a direct or indirect risk to human health. 210 
Destruction was by and large the most common action undertaken for illicit fruits, vegetables, 211 
fishery, poultry and other food categories possibly as the consignments were deemed to be a 212 
risk to human or animal health or because persons responsible for the consignment failed to 213 
comply with the direction to re-export (Pocknell, Tanner & Ambrose, 2017). The nature of 214 
food products involved in the problem of illegal imports is diverse including: seafood products 215 
such as abalone in cans, shark fin, dried scallop, frozen pomfret, various POAO such as beef 216 
jerky, duck meat, pork, poultry and products thereof, frozen insects, soy-based products, 217 
bird’s nests and also ethnic food products.  218 
Take in Figure 1 and Table 1 219 
 220 
Within the RASFF data on illegal imports, China ranks consistently as one of the top 3 221 
country of concern and in the dataset considered in this research, China was recorded in 63 222 
food incidents associated with illegal trade. This echoes the wider work of Nepusz, Petroczi 223 
and Naughton (2009) who identify China as one of the country with the largest number of 224 
overall RASFF alerts for food and feed safety and fraud. In fact, Beestermoller, Disdier and 225 
Fontagne (2016) report an overall 11.4% rejection rate of Chinese shipments (out of 14,860) 226 
during the period 1979 to 2011 suggesting a challenge in meeting EU sanitary standards.   227 
 The discourse surrounding underground and illegal food economies and the 228 
associated vulnerabilities that businesses may face is opaque and complex. It is particularly 229 
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difficult to quantify illegal or unregulated movements of food, feed and beverage products 230 
and very few studies of this type have been conducted (Fèvre, Bronsvoort, Hamilton & 231 
Cleaveland, 2006) although more recently the body of literature is growing as demonstrated 232 
in this paper. A number of factors specifically influence the vulnerability of organisations to 233 
illicit materials as a result of smuggling. These factors include, but are not limited to, market 234 
competition, supply chain pressure and power dynamics, resource scarcity, inadequate 235 
governance, lack of sanctions and low probability of discovery, rapid development of systems, 236 
logistics and technology, data swamping and intentional opacity (Manning, Soon, Aguiar, 237 
Eastham & Higashi 2017; Manning, Smith & Soon, 2016; Charlebois, Schwab, Henn & Huck, 238 
2016; Marvin et al., 2016). Further, compartmentalisation of operational management, lack 239 
of transparency about practices and processes and information opacity increases the 240 
longevity of smuggling activities and protects against the impact of disruption, whistleblowing 241 
or infiltration by regulatory or law enforcement agencies. Illicit economies cannot be seen as 242 
simply a binary function of either legal or illegal products, ingredients or indeed actors 243 
(Manning et al., 2017). Instead they often represent transience or an acceptance and 244 
tolerance of customary illegality by predominantly legal economic actors (Gregson and Crang, 245 
2016).   246 
 Informal food networks, behave in the same way as criminal networks and are 247 
characterised by their heterogenicity i.e. their diversity in composition, density of 248 
connections, size, structure, shape, underlying bonding mechanisms, degree of sophistication, 249 
and scope of activities (Williams, 2011). Further, the capacity for food trafficking networks to 250 
cross national borders creates an advantage because it enables them to supply markets where 251 
the profit margins are largest, whilst operating from and in countries where risks are the least 252 
(Manning et al., 2016). Illegality as an attribute of a food is therefore transient i.e. once an 253 
illegally imported material has been re-packaged, or incorporated into a food product the 254 
inherent illicit nature of the first state has subsequently been masked. Further illicitness is not 255 
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an intrinsic, embedded property of the goods that can be tested or analysed and thus 256 
identified and mitigated against at some point in the supply chain. Instead illicitness 257 
represents a transient extrinsic quality attribute often linked to the logistical aspects and 258 
mechanisms of distribution or circulation of a given food item (Gregson and Crang, 2016).  259 
Effective action against food smuggling at the food supply chain level is underpinned by 260 
reducing opacity, minimising acceptance of opportunistic behaviours within a given business 261 
environment (Manning et al., 2017; Soon and Manning, 2017). 262 
 Whether at a multi-member trading block level, setting national priorities to combat 263 
smuggling or at a discrete supply chain or business level, the undertaking of food fraud 264 
vulnerability risk assessments to determine the potential for such activity in the food supply 265 
chain is an evolving art. At present the process is largely qualitative or semi-quantitative 266 
(Manning et al., 2016) and built on a number of assumptions that, due to the cost involved, 267 
are not fully tested or explored. This means that new predictive methods need to be 268 
developed to address food smuggling and trafficking in order to protect the food economy 269 
and most specifically prevent harm to the consumer, both in terms of the financial and the 270 
health impacts. One associated consumer item where anti-trafficking and smuggling protocols 271 
are in place is tobacco and these are now developments are considered in order to translate 272 
such protocols to the scenario of controlling illicit food. 273 
 274 
5. Lessons from tobacco smuggling: context and controls 275 
Tobacco is one of the most commonly smuggled commodities in the world (Interpol, 276 
2014). Illicit trade in tobacco products is a serious threat to public health, increases 277 
accessibility and affordability of tobacco products and undermines tobacco control policies 278 
such as pricing and tax measures (WHO, 2013). China is the largest tobacco market with one 279 
third of total consumption, at approximately two trillion cigarettes per annum, and producing 280 
around 190 billion counterfeit cigarettes annually of which 15-20% are exported (Allen, 2012). 281 
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Global illicit trade in tobacco affects around one in nine cigarettes (around 657 billion 282 
cigarettes), leads to over US$40-50 billion in lost tax revenue and involves multiple stages of 283 
illegal behaviour including illegal manufacturing, counterfeiting of existing brands and then 284 
smuggling activities to avoid and evade tax representing around 600 billion cigarettes per 285 
annum (Interpol, 2014; Allen, 2012; Joossens & Raw, 2012). The loss of tax revenue in the EU 286 
for cigarette smuggling was reported in 2012 as 12.5 billion Euros (Interpol, 2014). The impact 287 
of this illicit trade can be translated to considering food smuggling and trafficking too in terms 288 
of impact on economic development, the weakening of the legitimate industry in terms of 289 
employment, innovation, trade and distribution; the impact on the social fabric of society, 290 
especially as the crime is targeted at the poor and vulnerable in terms of the market for the 291 
illicit goods; the undermining too of national abd international health policy objectives; and 292 
lost revenue that threatens the tax base of economies and the rule of law; and finally the 293 
crime supports corrupt practices, and funds organised crime possibly even terrorism and 294 
wider criminal activity (Allen, 2012). The causes and facilitating factors of illicit tobacco trade 295 
have been synthesized from the literature into categories: financial, knowledge, logistics and 296 
data management infrastructure, policy framework and tolerance of illicit behaviour (Table 297 
2). 298 
Take in Table 2 299 
 300 
Factors that influence the illicit trade in tobacco can be considered under the following 301 
themes:  302 
 financial advantages,  303 
 data opacity,  304 
 the development of logistics networks that aid distribution of illegal tobacco,  305 
 the tolerance of illicit behaviour and weak policy measures; and 306 
  weak consumer knowledge.  307 
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Weak policy measures that influence both tobacco and food smuggling and trafficking include: 308 
inadequate legislation and sanctions, the weak enforcement of regulatory controls; the lack 309 
of robust official controls in free trade zones and on goods in transit; the lack of coordination 310 
of government agencies and weak goal alignment; having protectionist policy measures such 311 
as tariffs that create incentives to deceive;  the disparities in tax driven prices between 312 
jurisdictions; unbalanced fiscal policy with high tax burden including value added tax (VAT) on 313 
the products that are at risk of being smuggled; weak information exchange systems at 314 
national and international level; and no, or if present, poorly functioning public awareness 315 
campaigns.  316 
Joossens and Raw (2012) argue illicit trade can be split into: (1) legal products that are 317 
illegally distributed within national boundaries; (2) illegal products distributed within national 318 
boundaries; (3) legal products illegally distributed across borders; and (4) illegal product 319 
distributed across borders. For example, the manufacture, movement and smuggling of 320 
counterfeit cigarettes from China are controlled by highly organised criminal syndicates 321 
causing a loss of income for registered trademarks owned by many of the transnational 322 
tobacco corporations (Allen, 2012).  Elements of a comprehensive strategy to address illicit 323 
tobacco trade and by inference illicit food trade are the developing of effective legal and 324 
institutional frameworks in association with effective, transparent communication and 325 
cooperation systems (see Table 3). These elements would form an effective strategy towards 326 
illicit food trade. 327 
Take in Table 3 328 
The World Health Organisation Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC, 2003) 329 
is a treaty that was adopted in May 2003.  The Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco 330 
Products is the first protocol for the WHO FCTC and the protocol was adopted in 2012 (WHO, 331 
nd). The Protocol builds upon and complements Article 15 of the WHO FCTC that focused on 332 
countering illicit tobacco trade as part of an overall tobacco control policy (WHO, 2013). In 333 
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this context illicit trade is described as “any practice or conduct prohibited by law and which 334 
relates to production, shipment, receipt, possession, distribution, sale or purchase, including 335 
any practice or conduct intended to facilitate such activity” (WHO, 2013 p.6). Article 7 of the 336 
Protocol focuses on the role of due diligence checks before and during any business 337 
relationships such as establishing that suppliers are natural or legal entities with business 338 
registration numbers, article of incorporation etc. that criminal checks are undertaken and 339 
bank accounts intended to be used in transactions are verified. The Protocol also requires 340 
parties to develop a “global” tracking and tracing system using unique, secure and non-341 
removable identification markings and that individual batches can be traced to manufacture 342 
and other supply chain records, facilities and production lines, intermediaries and shipment 343 
routes and destinations. Some systems of tracking and tracing involve the use of digital coding 344 
technology and authentication tools on packaging, however interoperability of systems is key 345 
to the success of anti-smuggling procedures i.e. via “open” coding standards across 346 
manufacturers, common reporting standards so customs officials can use the same 347 
methodology to read codes and a standard regulatory report source  (Allen, 2012). These 348 
could include 1D, 2D or 3D barcoding and radio-frequency identification (RFID) systems. 349 
 Supply chain strategies to address illicit tobacco trade operate at three levels 350 
influencing and reducing the supply of raw materials to illegal operations, reducing illicit 351 
manufacturing capacity and putting pressure on illegal distribution networks from growing 352 
through to sales of finished product (Interpol, 2014). This example demonstrates what can be 353 
achieved with global concensus on addressing illicit trade in a commodity, in this case tobacco, 354 
and much of the control systems proposed can be readily translated to address food 355 
smuggling and trafficking. 356 
 357 
6. Conclusion 358 
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The capacity for illicit food networks to cross national borders often avoiding tariffs or 359 
regulatory control creates an economic advantage for those actors involved. Illicit food trade, 360 
described in this paper as smuggling, enables perpetrators to supply value-added markets 361 
where the profit margins are largest, whilst operating from and often in countries where risks 362 
of discovery of their activity are the least and this dark food trade is largely unquantified by 363 
current research activity. Illegality can be transient i.e. once an illegally imported material has 364 
been re-packaged, or incorporated into a composite food product its illicit nature can be 365 
masked.   366 
The literature and data explored in this conceptual paper outlines firstly that the 367 
prevalence of illegal food trade makes this a subject worthy of note and in need of further 368 
empirical research. It is important not to consider illegal food trade as being totally distinct 369 
from legal trade. It should be recognised that illegal activity, including smuggling or trafficking 370 
rather than being a parallel food chain is actually embedded within existing food markets and 371 
supply chain activities. The use of the tobacco case study demonstrates what can be achieved 372 
through international collaboration to address illicit trade. However factors such as 373 
cooperation, global standards development, transparency and regulatory oversight are key 374 
influencers in mitigating food smuggling and trafficking. 375 
  376 
 15 
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Table 1 Top 5 EU food categories of illegal import and food trade (1987-2017) 637 
Food categories 
(total number of 
notifications) 
Sub-categories 
of illegal import 
and food trade 
Description of fraud (examples) Number of 
notifications 
Meat (62) Attempt to 
illegally import 
Attempt to illegally import frozen 
boneless beef from Uruguay 
12 
 Illegal import Illegal import (bovine casings 
declared as sheep casings) of bovine 
casings (Bubalus bubalis) from 
Pakistan 
15 
 Illegal trade Illegal trade of frozen pork tender 
loins with falsified Italian health 
mark, dispatched from Malaysia 
13 
 Suspicion of 
attempt to 
illegally import 
Suspicion of attempt to illegally 
import frozen beef tongue from 
Brazil 
2 
 Suspicion of 
illegal trade 
Suspicion of illegal trade of frozen 
beef meat from Ireland via the 
Netherlands 
4 
 Unauthorised 
import 
Unauthorised import of frozen 
bovine offals (tongues) (Bos taurus) 
from Brazil 
2 
 Unauthorised 
transit 
Unauthorised transit of corned beef 
from Brazil 
14 
    
Fruits and 
vegetables (58) 
Attempt to 
illegally import 
Attempt to illegally import dried 
beans from Nigeria 
52 
 Illegal import Illegal import (contains poultry DNA) 
of salted spicy soy from China 
4 
 Unauthorised 
import 
Unauthorised import of sprouted 
sugar beet seeds from France, 
dispatched from Egypt 
1 
 Illegal trade  Illegal trade of canned asparagus 
from Spain 
1 
    
Other food 
products (39) 
Illegal import Illegal import of pork legs, abalone 
in cans, dried scallops, shark fin 
10 
 Attempt to 
illegally import 
Illegal import of and absence of 
health certificate(s) for various food 
products from Vietnam 
25 
 Unauthorised 
transit 
Bad hygienic state and unauthorised 
transit of various products of animal 
origin from China 
1 
 Unauthorised 
import 
Unauthorised import of swallow's 
nests extract from China 
3 
    
Fish (35) Attempt to 
illegally import 
Attempt to illegally import and 
absence of health certificate(s) for 
chilled swordfish (Xiphias gladius) 
from Morocco 
18 
 22 
Food categories 
(total number of 
notifications) 
Sub-categories 
of illegal import 
and food trade 
Description of fraud (examples) Number of 
notifications 
 Illegal import Illegal import (false certificate) of 
hake (Merluccius spp.) from Ecuador 
9 
 Suspicion of 
attempt to 
illegally import 
Absence of health certificate(s) for 
and suspicion of attempt to illegally 
import frozen cuttlefish and squid 
(Sepia officinalis) from Morocco 
3 
 Suspicion of 
illegal trade 
Suspicion of illegal trade of frozen 
eel (Anguilla anguilla) from France 
1 
 Unauthorised 
import 
Unauthorised import of frozen 
yellowtail tuna fillets from Japan 
2 
 Illegal trade Illegal trade and unauthorised 
placing on the market of fresh 
fishery products from Poland 
2 
    
Poultry meat 
(29) 
Attempt to 
illegally import 
Attempt to illegally import of frozen 
chicken breasts in consignment of 
frozen taro from China 
21 
 Illegal trade Illegal trade of various poultry meat 
from unknown origin 
1 
 Illegal import Illegal import of frozen poultry meat 
from China, via Hong Kong 
3 
 Suspicion of 
illegal trade 
Suspicion of illegal trade of chicken 
breast from unknown origin 
3 
 Unauthorised 
import 
Unauthorised import of roasted 
boneless whole duck from China 
1 
  Grand total 223 
Source: RASFF System 638 
Table 2. Factors cited as being of influence in the illicit tobacco trade (Adapted from Allen, 639 
2012; Interpol 2014) 640 
 
Factors of influence 
 
Financial 
 Customers seeking to save money. 
 Smokers wanting cheaper products. 
 Affordability for those on low incomes or in an economic downturn. 
 Criminals seeking to make money including taking advantage of tax differentials. 
 Opportunity to launder money.  
 Legitimate businesses turning a blind eye to increase profit. 
Logistics and data management infrastructure 
 Tobacco manufacturers seeking to penetrate new markets. 
 Growth in illegal distribution and criminal networks. 
 New transit routes and infrastructure being developed in countries with weak 
regulatory control. 
 Oversupply of tobacco products in source country. 
 23 
 Poor quality data in terms of records and import/export declarations, inadequate 
data handing capacity and unreliable information technology infrastructure. 
 Ease and cost of smuggling as tobacco is light and portable. 
Policy framework 
 Inadequate legislation and sanctions especially with regard to intellectual 
property. 
 Weak enforcement of controls, lack of enforcement capacity, poorly trained 
police forces and inspection officials and lack of political will to fight illicit trade in 
source countries leading to low prosecution rates and weak penalties for 
offenders. 
 Weak official border controls. 
 Lack of robust official controls in free trade zones and on goods in transit.   
 Lack of cooperation and coordination of government agencies and weak goal 
alignment 
 Protectionist policy measures such as tariffs. 
 Disparities in tax driven prices between jurisdictions.  
 An unbalanced fiscal policy with a high tax burden on tobacco products. 
 Weak information exchange systems at national and international level. 
 Poorly functioning or lacking public awareness campaigns. 
Tolerance of illicit behaviour 
 Level of corruption (e.g. as measured by the Transparency Index). 
 Corruption and bribery of public officials. 
 Public tolerance of the illicit trade in tobacco products. 
Knowledge 
 Consumer inability to recognise illegal product. 
 641 
  642 
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Table 3. Elements of a comprehensive strategy to address illicit tobacco trade (Adapted 643 
from Allen, 2012) 644 
 645 
Elements 
 Achieve top level political ownership to ensure sufficient prioritisation and the 
necessary resources are made available to address illicit trade.   
 Understand and monitor the size and nature of the problem e.g. through an 
unexplained drop in legal market sales as identified by the industry or associated 
tax revenue, increased incidence of illegal product seizures (frequency of 
incidents or volume of product); emergence of new brands as is also seen with 
illicit trade in alcohol.   
 Adopt a balanced tax policy and operate effective tax collection and means to 
recover tax revenue losses and destruction costs e.g. asset confiscation.  
 Analyze existing legislation and regulations to ensure they work and are enforced 
effectively and that offences are clearly identified, the penalties for contravention 
are adequate and act as a deterrent; systematic destruction of illicit products and 
illicit supply chain infrastructure and effective tracking and tracing mechanisms. 
 Conduct full impact assessments of any proposed tobacco related legislation.   
 Ensure the judiciary is aware of the seriousness of the crime and the need to 
destroy illicit product and equipment in a timely manner.  
 Evaluate the main facilitators, including manufacturing and export controls, Free 
Zones and transit operations, etc.    
 Develop an enforcement strategy that includes all relevant national agencies and 
ensure they possess adequate powers to act effectively.   
 Provide sufficient financial resources for adequate law enforcement capacity.   
 Tackle demand by educating and informing the public about the implications of 
the illicit trade.   
 Build and strengthen partnerships between national and international agencies.   
 Cooperate with legitimate industry players to make the best use of combined 
intelligence and resources.  
 Implement anti-money laundering provisions and transparent payment 
procedures. 
 Implement a track and trace programme for products.  
 
 646 
 647 
 648 
 649 
 650 
 651 
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 653 
Figure 1 Reported illegal import and food trade from 1987 – 2017 (n=347) (RASFF 2017) 654 
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